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INTRODUCTION 
. Technology's fingerprints are found all over the recent financial 
reporting scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global 
Crossing and the like. The firms caught up in the scandals were 
disproportionately either in the technology sector or were 
technology-driven competitors in related product markets. They 
were especially attractive as investments to a generation of 
investors using on-line brokerage accounts and financial 
websites-an information-rich environment that promised to 
empower the retail trader vis-a-vis the dominating mutual funds, 
hedge funds, and pension plans. 
Just as important, many of these firms were innovators in how 
they used technology in both financing and conducting their 
businesses. Enron is now the best-studied example, 1 with massive 
utilization of structured finance techniques and derivatives to create 
an "asset lite" strategy wherein both assets and liabilities were 
quickly moved one step outside the formal boundaries ofthe firm to 
numerous affiliated special purpose entities.2 These financing 
techniques themselves would be impossible without sophisticated 
technology that enabled Enron to become more an energy-based 
investment bank than a traditional supplier of natural resources. 
And even business-to-business relationships structured by many of 
these firms were innovative, with firms using information and 
communications technology to create more embedded relationships 
with customers and suppliers characterized by "just in time" 
production and delivery. 
My claim is that the technology link to the recent disclosure 
scandals is no coincidence.3 To be sure, cheating tempts all who seek 
1. For a good overview from an economic and accounting perspective, see Paul M. Healy 
& Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. EcoN. PERsP. 3 (2003). 
2. The legal literature concerning Enron is rapidly becoming voluminous, both in terms 
of official investigations and academic commentary. See generally WILLIAM C. PoWERS, JR. ET 
AL., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INvESTIGATIVE COMMITI'EE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), alJaUable at http://news.findlaw.coml 
hdocsldocs/enron/sicreport; Douglas M. Branson, Enron-When All Systems Fail: CreanlJe 
Destruction or Roodmap to Corporate Gouernance Reform'?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 989 (2003); 
William Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1275 (2002). 
3. For a pre-scandal paper drawing the connection between technological evolution and 
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wealth, in whatever line of business they find themselves. I want to 
show, however, how the rapid pace of innovation at a number of 
levels offered motive, opportunity, and rationalization for a 
downshift in financial reporting norms, which in turn made outright 
fraud more probable. 
Understanding the root causes of the scandals is important 
because of the need for care in choosing a response. The popular 
story of the scandals, born out of a great deal of frustration and 
anger, is one of corporate greed-misreporting as a stark form 
of corruption and hence "evil." While greed certainly had a role, 
the misreporting was far more complicated and ambiguous, both 
in terms of underlying motivation and its impact on investors. 
Technology's multiple dimensions set in motion a feedback loop in 
which many managers came to believe that aggressive reporting-
close to the line and perhaps over it-was both necessary and 
justifiable. During most of the 1990s, the SEC and the courts did 
relatively little in response--even though the practices were 
becoming more and more notorious-thereby sending a message of 
tacit acquiescence. Putting aside the most egregious cases, the story 
may thus be more of mixed signals and situational pressures run 
amok than anything unusually corrupt about the dispositions of the 
managers involved. As Warren Buffett said in 1997, well before the 
scandals ever emerged, the inclination to engage in deceptive 
earnings management had made it "very tough to cleanse the 
system ... because you don't have good guys and bad guys 
anymore.'" 
If that is so, then the right reaction is probably not moral outrage 
and the right regulatory response is not necessarily the broad-brush 
criminalization threatened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. 5 This 
a decline in reporting norms, see Gene D'Avolio et al., Technology, Information Production 
and Market Efficiency (Sept. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), allailable at http://post. 
economics.harvard.edulhierI2001papersf2002Iist.html. On the link between technological 
change and disclosure policy, see Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effectille Ri8k 
Disclosure for Technology·Enhanced Inllesting, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753 (1997). 
4. Lawrence A. Cunningham, ed., Conllersanons from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 
CARDOZO L. REv. 719, 799 (1997). 
5. Sarbanes-Oxley does much more than criminalize. I do not mean to be critical of the 
Act's overall thrust, especially as it addresses conflict of interest problems in corporate 
governance, accounting, investment banking, and the provision of legal services. See, e.g., 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heauy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It 
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is not to trivialize or to excuse financial misreporting: it causes 
serious harm and requires a potent remedy. And in some of the 
cases-Enron, for example-the misconduct went way out of 
bounds. The point is simply that choosing the right forum for 
adjudication and remedy requires a more nuanced analysis of what 
happened and why, not the lumping of all the scandals together into 
an undifferentiated mass. That story begins with the state of 
technology and innovation in the 1990s. 
I. TECHNOLOGY'S FIRST DIMENSION: THE ISSUERS THEMSELVES 
Enron, we know, was an energy business that transformed itself 
into an investment bank making markets in energy trading, 
broadband, and many other synthetic assets-an extraordinarily 
sophisticated, technology-based task.s WorldCom was one of the 
major players in telecommunications, and Global Crossing was an 
innovator in the trans-oceanic communications business. Adelphia, 
Xerox, AOL-Time Warner and so many others fit the same mold. 
What could a firm's product line have to do with either the motive 
or opportunity to manage earnings or other financial metrics? I 
shall explore some of the connections in more detail below, including 
the simple fact that retail investors became fascinated with stocks 
that had a technology-based story.7 At a higher level of generality, 
however, an important common thread was the perception that cut-
throat competition was necessary to grow. There was a strong sense 
during the 1990s that the Internet and related technological 
changes provided a short window of opportunity for firms to achieve 
the scale necessary to be a winner (or survivor) in newly redefined 
product lines. Many competitors would not survive if they did not 
fight for growth. Those that succeeded would be lavishly rewarded 
in something resembling a winner-take-all tournament. "Eat or be 
eaten" was a common incantation. As a result, both hope and fear-
Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003). For a more critical view, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Saroanes-
Oxley Act of2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002). 
6. Forathoroughreview,seeFRANKPARTNOY,INFECTIousGREED:HowDECEITANDRISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETs (2003); see also Healy & Palepu, supra note 1. 
7. See Eli Ofek & Michael Richardson, DotCom Man.ia: The Rise and Fall of Internet 
Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113 (2003). 
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two of the most profound motivators in human and organizational 
psychology8-were strongly at work. 
The connection to financial misreporting here is two-fold, and the 
duality is important. Growth is financed in the capital markets, 
either through infusions of capital (lPOs, borrowings, etc.) or 
through stock-for-stock acquisitions of existing or potential competi-
tors. The higher the perceived valuation of the company, the more 
it could accelerate its growth through equity-based financing; the 
more solid its balance sheet and cash flow, the more it could 
leverage itself in the debt market and avoid default on existing 
debt.9 More indirectly, reported measures of strong growth could be 
of value in other markets, including the attraction of high-quality 
employees and the gaining of customers. The latter deserves special 
note. In a market where many firms are likely to disappear quickly, 
customers naturally seek out the most likely survivors to establish 
dependable relationships. Firms that demonstrate strong earnings 
and revenue growth are most likely to survive, which can in turn 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more firms can convince 
customers to make long-term commitments, the more they gain 
resources enabling them to be around for the long term. Of course, 
once the motivation to demonstrate strong revenue and earnings is 
seen, the temptation to create illusions of success is equally clear. 
The other connection is managerial motivation. Growth in highly 
competitive markets is difficult and takes a highly motivated 
management team. Conservatism, much less sloth, is deadly. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, firms rapidly increased the use of 
incentive pay for executives and other key employees as the primary 
component of their compensation packages.1o Stock options, in 
particular? came to dominate in technology-based industries, 
gradually migrating into many other market segments where 
8. See generally Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, 20 
Anv ANCES IN ExPERIMENTAL SOc. PsYCHOL. 255 (1987) (exploring the contours of risk and the 
study of risky behavior). 
9. On the connection between debt covenants and the incentive to manage or misreport 
earnings, see Patricia Dechow et aI., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An 
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. REs. 1, 21 
(1996); see also Thomas Fields et aI., Empirical Research on Accounting Choice, 31 J. ACCT. 
& ECON. 255 § 4.2.2 (2001). 
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et aI., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation. 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751, 791-92 (2002). 
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growth pressures were increasing. Though not well acknowledged 
at the time, this trend produced an obvious agency-cost problem 
because executives could cash out their stock in the near-term stock 
market.ll We could ,expect them, therefore, to focus obsessively on 
. the. immediate stock price-and perhaps manipulate it if they 
could-with less attention to the long term. 
In the aftermath of Enron and the like, this second story has 
come to dominate, and many of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms operate 
on the premise that these scandals simply demonstrated the 
severity of the agency-cost problem. The popular account was about 
executive selfishness and greed to the detriment of the firm's 
shareholders. My suspicion, however, is that while both accounts 
are important, it is actually the first that takes precedence. 12 An 
important force that was driving the managers in Enron and 
WorldCom to create illusions of growth was that any disclosure of 
weaknesses or problems (shortfalls in customer orders, increases in 
costs or liabilities, etc.) would have translated into an advantage for 
the firms' competitors and a potentially lethal loss of competitive 
edge in the product or capital marketplace. 
That these illusions also directly increased the managers' own 
wealth is far from trivial-basic psychology teaches that executive 
inference is heavily self-servingI3-but hard to disentangle from the 
connection to financial misreporting. The fact that so many of the 
executives in these scandals sold only portions of their portfolios 
11. See id.; see also Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timinc Corporate Disclosures to 
Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned IncentilJes?, 35 WAKE 
FOREST L. REv. 83, 86-88 (2000). 
12. See Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnincs: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. EeON. PERgP. 27, 36 
(2003): . 
While the image of managers who feather their own nests attracts an 
understandably large share of attention ... my sense is that the more common 
reason for earnings manipulation is that managers, forever the optimists, are 
trying to "weather out the storm" -that is, to continue operations with adequate 
funding and customer/supplier support until better times come. 
On the role of skewed disclosure to non-investor constituencies as a motivation to mislead, 
see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A BehalJioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market InlJestors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101,115-
18 (1997). 
13. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, BehalJioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: 
Skewed Trade-offs Between Self and Other, in CoDES OF CoNDUCT: BEHAVIORAL REsEARcH 
INTO BUSINESS Ennes 214,221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
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before the collapse of their stock prices strongly suggests that the 
frauds that occurred were not primarily about personal wealth 
maximization. Executives were betting that the illusions could 
indeed become self-fulfilling-that the immediate competitive gains 
from shading the truth would more than compensate for any harms 
flowing from a loss of credibility were the truth eventually to be 
discovered. Many of these bets were predictably overly optimistic. 14 
Most, however, were probably made with the sense that, at the time, 
they were aggressively consistent with the firm's interests. 
II. TECHNOLOGY'S SECOND DIMENSION: THE RISE OF THE 
UNSTABLE RETAIL INVESTOR 
The second place where technology played an important causal 
role in the financial scandals was in the mechanisms of investment. 
The unfixing of brokerage commission rates in the 1970s led to the 
rise of the discount broker, who cut commission fees by reducing 
the broker's role in the provision of customized investment advice. 
The broker's self-interest, however, was still in active trading by 
the customer, hence the search was on for low-cost ways of 
prompting customer demand. By the 1990s, the Internet offered the 
ideal mechanism, permitting inexpensive, rapid execution without 
any costly broker involvement yet providing a rich display of 
investment-related information that-if portrayed in the right 
way~ould entice the investor to trade with greater and greater 
frequency.15 Soon on-line trading became the norm for the active 
retail investor, growing with exceptional speed. By the first quarter 
of 2000, some twenty percent of all trading was being generated by 
on-line accounts. 16 
14. See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 306, 314-15 (1999) (reporting an empirical study 
showing that much of the confidence of market entrance is misplaced); Langevoort, supra note 
12, at 139-41. 
15. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. EcON. 
PERSP. 41, 41-42 (2001); see also SEC Special Study: On-line Brokerages: Keeping Apace of 
Cyberspace, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 86,222 (Nov. 22, 1999) 
(discussing the brokerage industry of the future and its implications on regulations). For a 
prescient analysis, see Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transactions Costs, and Investor Welfare: 
Is a Motley Fool Born Every Minuter, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791 (1997). 
16. See D'Avolio et al., supra note 3, at 6. 
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This phenomenon was fed not only by the on-line brokerage firms 
such as E-trade but by the financial media as well. Financial 
websites delivered greater streams of data and cable television 
followed suit. A number of cable networks devoted their program-
ming during trading hours completely to market and issuer 
information, making celebrities of executives, analysts, and their 
own reporters. The connection between cable coverage and on-line 
trading is clear. A study by Busse and Green of a popular show on 
CNBC showed that stocks mentioned favorably, on average, had a 
forty-one basis point positive abnormal return in the first minute of 
an interview that was favorable to the issuer and sixty-two basis 
points within fifteen minutes.17 Retail investors were competing 
with market professionals to gain an edge via rapid-fire trading. 
The growing influence of retail investors in daily trading-
especially those focused on the technology sector18-suggests that 
prices may have become more volatile and noisy as a result.19 
Putting aside for a moment the wisdom of professional traders, 
recent studies of retail investor behavior demonstrate marked 
tendencies to trade on "pseudo-news" rather than careful fundamen-
tal analysis,20 resulting in a tendency toward trend-chasing and 
overreaction to highly salient bits of information. The deepest study 
of actual on-line trading in accounts at a large discount brokerage 
firm during the 1990s showed that on-line traders demonstrated 
considerable overconfidence, trading at higher and higher velocity 
in response to positive market news with little regard for the fact 
that even their discounted brokerage fees were eating up their 
returns.21 At times the evidence is comical. During the 19908, MCI 
17. Jeffrey A. Busse & T. Clifton Green, Market Efficiency in Real Time, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 
415,421 (2002). To be sure, this effect dissipated quickly, and Busse and Green do not put it 
forth as evidence of inefficiency. The point is simply to illustrate the potential for influencing 
prices on a more sustained basis. 
18. See Ofek & Richardson, supra note 7. 
19. See Theresa A Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and 
the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225, 272-73 (2001). 
20. See David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533, 1543 
(2001). I reviewed this literature from a legal viewpoint in Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the 
Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 135 (2002). 
21. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The 
Common Stock Investment Performance ofIndividualInvestors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 799-800 (2000). 
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(coincidentally, the company that became WorldCom) was a fast-
growing company. Its ticker symbol was MCIC; a small closed-end 
investment company, Massmutual Corporate Investors, had claimed 
the symbol MCL With regularity, the release of positive news by the 
big MCI would lead to a statistically significant run-up in the price 
of Massmutual shares simply because investors were mistakenly 
buying its stock because of the confusing ticker symbols.22 
It appears that increasing retail investor involvement in the daily 
trading markets contributed to a nontrivial reduction in market 
efficiency, at least in the technology sector.23 The increasing 
influence of the so-called noise traders made it more likely that 
markets would be hyper-sensitive to some kinds of information that 
are, in the proper context, relatively insignificant, while being 
insensitive to other kinds of information that may be more relevant 
to the company's long-term prospects. Consequently, on-line trading 
began to flourish roughly at the same time that companies became 
so fearful of falling short of analyst earnings estimates even by a 
penny.24 
If this correlation between investor overreaction and earnings 
management is accurate, the first two technology stories connect. 
As I have shown, issuers were under increasing pressure to create 
favorable impressions in the capital markets and avoid negative 
surprises. Noise trading made the markets more easily manipula-
ble, as issuers learned what kinds of disclosures would excite 
investors-and gain favorable attention on outlets like CNBC-and 
what had to be avoided. The disclosure and financial reporting 
script was rewritten for a more emotional, less sophisticated 
audience. This was also the time, it turns out, when some sell-side 
22. See Michael S. Rashes, Massively Confused Investors Making Conspicuously Ignorant 
Choices (MCI·MCIC), 56 J. FIN. 1911, 1912-13 (2001). 
23. See Ofek & Richardson, supra note 7. 
24. The evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. One study has shown that fmns with 
relatively greater institutional ownership are more likely to work hard to meet or exceed 
expectations-i.e., engage in careful earnings management. See Dawn A. Matsumoto, 
Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises, 77 ACCT. REv. 483, 489 (2002). 
That would suggest that earnings management is targeted at active institutional traders; 
however, it is at least plausible that the institutional traders are engaging in momentum 
strategies premised on predictions of overreaction by retail investors. 
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investment analysts were allegedly being enlisted to assist issuers 
in their reporting "spin" instead of offering unbiased advice. 25 
In sum, both the motive and the opportunity to create sustained 
illusions in the markets increased during the 1990s. This, in turn, 
had an effect on the psyches of corporate executives.26 The financial 
reporting process commands respect when disclosure of material 
information leads to a measured, rational response. When pseudo-
news excites or depresses, and much important detail and perspec-
tive seems simply to be ignored, managers can readily become 
cynical about disclosure and reporting, seeing it as little more than 
a game. This conception of disclosure can easily lead them to 
trivialize the substance of mandatory disclosure, resulting in 
managers giving themselves implicit permission to skew the facts 
without substantial guilt, so long as they think that the firm and its 
long-term shareholders benefit from the spin. It is easy to think that 
an investment marketplace that acts with more exuberance than 
prudence neither wants nor deserves disclosure in strict conformity 
to the rules. That rationalization contributed mightily to the 
devolution of reporting norms. 27 
25. See, e.g., Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of 
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 657-60 (1999). This 
development, of course, became the basis for major reform efforts, as evidenced in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its aggressive enforcement led by New York Attorney General Elliot 
Spitzer. For a legal analysis, see Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as 
Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035 (2003). 
26. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations GapD in InlJestor Protection: 
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139, 1146-49 (2003). 
27. Until recently, at least, the foregoing discussion would quickly be met by the claim 
that noise traders cannot have a sustained impact on market prices because the smart money 
would arbitrage away the distance between the price and fundamental value. There is no 
doubt that arbitrage can and does work under some circumstances, but there is a growing 
acceptance that it does so very imperfectly. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The 
Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 47-49 (1997). Constraint on short-selling is one main 
reason. The other is that while there can be consensus among sophisticated traders that a 
price is too high or too low, the question of when the noise will dissipate is fraught with 
uncertainty. That risk leads to underinvestment in corrective trading. 
Enron has provided a good illustration, because many professionally advised pension funds 
and mutual funds were significant losers, buying Enron stock very late in the process (after 
warning signs were becoming more vivid) and holding too long. The explanations are varied, 
but many scholars focus on the herd-like behavior of portfolio managers-behavior that is a 
rational temptation given compensation arrangements in this field. See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers 
& Andrew Metrick, Institutional InlJestors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229,257 (2001); 
Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581,583-86 
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III. TECHNOLOGY'S THIRD DIMENSION: BREAKING THE TRADITIONAL 
BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 
A. Derivatives and Synthetics 
The fall of Enron, in particular, has focused much attention on 
the extensive use of structured finance techniques and derivatives 
financing in the structure of the modern corporation. Structured 
finance is the less technology-driven development of the two, though 
modern information technology is essential to it in important 
respects. Assets and liabilities can be transferred to a related entity 
for financing purposes such that investors need only be concerned 
with the financial condition of that entity, presumably leading to a 
more favorable evaluation. The accounting treatment-on which 
Enron slipped-permits the transferred assets and liabilities to be 
separated from the originating company's balance sheet and 
income statement.28 Derivatives are more clearly a product of 
technological innovation: highly complex, customized contractual 
arrangements for allocating the risk of almost anything between 
the counterparties. In Enron, the potency came from their combina-
tion.29 The special purpose entities entered into extraordinarily 
complicated risk allocation contracts with Enron that were pegged 
to a variety of measures, including Enron's own stock price. 
From a financial reporting standpoint, several points deserve 
attention. First, the fact that each derivative is customized makes 
(1999). Portfolio managers are much more concerned with not lagging behind their peers than 
with outperforming them, because the penaltylreward structure is asymmetric. If Enron has 
been doing well lately, the herd will be inclined to stay with the momentum and feed 
additional money into it, thereby accelerating the momentum in the short run. In the face of 
this phenomenon, managers are reluctant to defect from the group by selling for fear that the 
momentum will continue and they will be left behind. The effect is to feed the influence of the 
noise traders rather than to counteract it. 
28. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1309,1309-11 (2002). For a review of the accounting 
treatment, see Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron: A Financial 
Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1057 (2003). 
29. Frank Partnoy suggests that the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) by themselves would 
have been harmless without the derivatives element. See PARTNOY, supra note 6, at 373-92, 
397-99; Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death or-May, " 48 VILL. 
L. REv. 1245, 1249-62 (2003). 
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valuation difficult individually and impossible in the aggregate. The 
contingencies written into the arrangements are mind-numbingly 
intricate. Depending on how events play out, there are endless 
pos~ble end-states. And when these instruments are bundled into 
.the;finn's portfolio, they interact in countless possible ways. This 
uncertainty tempts financial executives who would prefer to hide 
the level of risk assumed by the finn, because even a sophisticated, 
dedicated investment analyst is unlikely to try to untangle the 
complexity.30 A finn, like Enron, that aggressively wants to leverage 
its capital structure can do so opaquely. In an efficient market the 
mystery itself would be penalized to reflect the outside world's risk 
ofuncertainty.31 Yet in the 1990s, at least, the market did not react 
. that way. 
Derivatives also blur-perhaps even make meaningless-the line 
between debt and equity. They are not equity securities because 
they involve obligations to pay. The complex set of contingencies 
typically built into them, however, permits the assumption of risk 
well beyond that ordinarily identified with debt. They fit nowhere 
particularly well, either on the balance sheet or the income state-
ment. Users of the financial statements who rely too heavily on 
simple metrics like solvency or earnings per share are endangered. 
In terms of the dimension described earlier, derivatives are part 
of the opportunity story-a firm wanting to create an illusion to gain 
access to capital or other resources can obscure its liabilities and 
risks far more easily by using them extensively. (Of course, so can 
executives whose motives are more selfish.) Likewise, the more 
insiders feel the need to gamble their way out of difficulty, the more 
they can do so without triggering the traditional financial metrics 
that signal trouble when more conventional techniques are used. 
30. See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for 
"Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 184-88 
(1997). 
31. This is a classic "lemons" problem, as described by George Akerlof. See George A. 
Akerlor, The Market for "Lemons": QualitatilJe Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. 
ECON. 488 (1970). 
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B. Business-to-Business Relationships 
The derivatives story behind Enron and some of the other 
financial scandals is well-known. Many of the scandals, however, 
have less to do with synthetic financial instruments and more to do 
with conventional accounting questions like revenue recogniiion32 
and capitalization versus expensing. Here, the technology link is 
more subtle but quite profound. 
There has been a so-called "revolution" in business-to-business 
relationships at both ends of the production process.33 The relation-
ship between firms and their suppliers has become much closer than 
the old-style market sale transaction. "Just in time" delivery 
systems emphasize supplier investment in firm-specific knowledge 
and close communication so that fluctuations in demand can be 
handled seamlessly. As many have noted, this revolution blurs the 
traditional boundaries of the firm.34 The "make or buy" decision that 
has long characterized the firm means less when external suppliers 
form supple long-term relationships with the company. These long-
term relationships represent a decision somewhere in between 
"make" or "buy." So, too, do customer relationships, which simply 
reflect this same dynamic a few steps down the line. 
The result is that many of the historic conventions of financial 
reporting have rapidly become much more artificia1.35 Here, 
32. For a good overview of revenue recognition fraud issues, see Manning Gilbert Warren 
III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 SMU L. REv. 885, 909-22 (2003). 
33. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan & Alice M. Rivlin, The Economy and the Internet: What Lies 
Ahead?, in THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 12-15 (Robert E. Litan 
& Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001). 
34. See, e.g., Andrew McAfee, Manufacturing: Lowering Boundaries, Improving 
Productivity, in THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF FROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 29, 39-41, 48-50, 55 
(Robert E. Litan & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001); Linda V. Ruchala, Managing and Controlling 
Specialized Assets, MGMT. ACCT., Oct. 1997, at 20, 26 (discussing how supplier-customer 
agreements, among other things, have "blurred the lines between organizations"). 
35. In addition to this trend, technology has an impact in terms of the relative value of 
intangible (i.e., intellectual) property as compared to other assets. Accounting's historic· 
reluctance to allow firms to claim the full value of these intangibles effectively hides them 
from view and implicitly penalizes firms whose value resides in the intangibles vis-A-vis those 
whose assets are more tangible. See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN 
WEALm: REPORT OF THE BROOKINGS TASKFORCE ON INTANGIBLES 7-10,23-31 (2001); ROBERT 
G. ECCLES ET AL., THE VALUE REPORTING REVOLUTION: MOVING BEYOND THE EARNINGS GAME 
221-24 (2001); see also Steven M.H. Wallman, The Future of Accounting and Disclosure in an 
Evolving World: The Need for Dramatic Change, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 81, 84-86 (1995). A feeling 
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WorldCom offers an example. The main form of accounting fraud 
alleged against WorldCom was the improper capitalization of $3.8 
billion in line costs (i.e., what WorldCom was paying for access to 
lines built and operated by third parties).36 By all accounts, 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require expensing 
theSe costs, which would reduce earnings. WorldCom improperly 
capitalized them instead and thus showed higher earnings.37 
While the rules may be clear enough, the economic reality is far 
less so. WorldCom officials appeared to justify their misreporting on 
grounds that these particular line costs would generate predictabl~ 
revenue over a definable period,just like a capital investment. Ifso, 
then expensing would also be misleading. Imagine that a company 
enters into a long-term contract to purchase line capacity, which 
creates a sense of security that enables the other firm to invest in 
building or expansion of that capacity. The economics are much the 
same as if the firm was building the capacity itself, which would 
permit capitalization and thus favorable income statement treat-
ment. By choosing an economically similar route that does not 
involve the formalities of internalization, a harsher result ensues. 
Now, consider this from the standpoint of the executive making 
the "make or buy" decision who believes that, simply from a 
business standpoint, the deal with the third party makes better 
sense. The technology of business relationships increasingly makes 
that kind of partnering feasible without taking on costly new 
employees, facilities, and so on. But to return to the first dimension, 
assume also that this is a fast-growing firm seeking the maximum 
advantage in access to capital, customers, and the like. The 
that this penalization was unfair would also contribute to a sense that the prevailing norms 
were illegitimate. 
36. See Jesse Drucker & Henny Sender, Sorry, Wrong Number: Strategy Behind 
Accounting Scheme, WALL ST. J., June 27,2002, at A9. For a description of the rationalization 
process, see First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner at 26-28, 
In re WorldCom, Inc. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-15533 (AJG» !hereinafter First Interim 
Report of Dick Thornburgh), available at http://www.graypanthers.org!wcom_library/ 
thornburgh_1.pdf. 
37. The capitalization occurred at a fairly late stage in the recording process as a result 
of high-level intervention to revise the treatment. See First Interim Report of Dick 
Thornburgh, supra note 36, at 25-29; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and 
Limits to Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 
2004) (manuscript at app. A), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstracLid 
=444600. 
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accounting penalty may be intolerable if it creates a competitive 
disadvantage, even if the economic distinctions are minimal. 
The executive will feel immense pressure to gain both, the 
economic and accounting edges. More importantly, if he or ,she 
manipulates the accounting decision to capitalize even though 
GAAP forbids it, there is unlikely to be much guilt. The convention 
is purely artificial, penalizing legitimate economic choices without 
reason other than to maintain old-fashioned distinctions in the 
rules.38 
Under these circumstances, some will adhere to the rules and 
others will not. Psychologists teach that compliance with the law, at 
least when there is a relatively low probability of detection, is 
heavily influenced by perceptions of the legitimacy of the rules.39 I 
strongly suspect that over the course of the 1990s, as the boundaries 
of the firm became less distinct with respect to both suppliers and 
customers, executives who had so much to lose from any given 
accounting treatment came to disdain the artificiality of the 
accounting rules as they applied to these areas. As that disdain 
developed into a sense that orthodox accounting was penalizing 
good business decisions, accounting's legitimacy was diminished, 
and the rate of manipulation and noncompliance rose. High-tech 
firms-whose emphasis on intangible assets already puts them at 
a disadvantage under prevailing norms of financial reporting40-
were especially likely to chafe under these constraints. And as 
noncompliance increased, the pressure grew for competitors to do 
the same, lest they put themselves hopelessly behind the more 
38. This point was made recently by SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman. 
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Financial Reform: Relevance and Reality in Financial 
Reporting, Address at the National Association for Business Economics (Sept. 16,2003), at 
http://www.sec.govlnewslspeech!spch091603cag.htm. 
39. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEoPLE OBEY THE LAw (1990). 
40. See supra note 35. The treatment of research and development expenditures, which 
in many cases require expensing rather than capitalization, is another example of 
penalization that many high-tech firms face. See, e.g., Baruch Lev & Theodore Sougiannis, 
Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D Effect, 26 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 419,435-
42 (1999); Lev, supra note 12, at 30-33. My sense, in part, is that the vehemence with which 
many high-tech firms fought to avoid the requirement that executive stock options be 
expensed was not simply selfish but also a product of the belief that they were already being 
disadvantaged and that expensing options would simply push them further backwards. 
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aggressive firms. Conservative accounting had become a loser's 
game. Financial reporting norms devolved for this reason, too. 
IV. THE FEEDBACK LooP 
A. Testing the Limits 
The three important lessons from the foregoing can be summa-
rized: 
(1) The incentive to misreport was as much, and maybe more, 
a product of competitive fear as it was a product of personal 
greed. Managers in fast-changing, technology-based markets 
became convinced that earnings aggressive management-and 
perhaps some cheating-was a survival tactic. Although there 
was, no doubt, much rationalization and self-serving inference 
used in developing this tactic, the basic fear was rational. 
(2) The stock market provided greater opportunity for 
cheating by shifting its focus away from careful fundamental 
analysis to indicators of short-term price movement-a "sound 
bite" culture. Greater retail participation in daily trading was an 
important force in this trend. 
(3) Innovation in business strategies made the lines drawn in 
the historic norms of financial reporting increasingly artificial 
and outdated. Playing conservatively by the accounting rules 
were seen as conforming to a regime in which fairness and 
utility were questionable as a reflection of economic reality. In 
the eyes of many managers, financial reporting had lost its 
relevance and legitimacy. 
These three factors combined into a feedback loop. Managers were 
pressured to push the limits of the prevailing norms. For a long time 
no one seriously pushed back. The market responded positively; 
indeed, it increased its expectations of performance so that exceed-
ing expectations became that much more difficult, requiring all the 
more aggressiveness.·1 The auditing profession was acquiescent, we 
41. See William H. Beaver, What We Have Learned from the Recen.t Corporate Scandals 
That We Did Not Already Know, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 163 (2002) (emphasizing the 
connection between high growth rates and targets and the pressure to engage in earnings or 
revenue deception). 
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are told, because of conflicts of interest in the generation of non-
audit fees. Such conflicts of interests are no doubt part of the story, 
but there is probably more to it. As the accounting norms them-
selves became more complicated and subjective, the ability to 
confidently say "no" to a client diminished.42 I suspect that many 
accountants were also coming to share managers' views about the 
contemporary relevance of accounting principles,43 which also led to 
a loss of faith that there were cognizable lines that management 
should not be allowed to cross. 
Nor did the legal system push back. Through most of the 1990s, 
the SEC was quiet about overly aggressive financial reporting, 
coming to the subject with too little, too late.44 The explanation here 
is a mix of limited resources and politics.45 Especially during the 
height of the bull market in technology stocks, executives from the 
high-tech industry held immense political power, securing major 
reform of private securities litigation and beating back initiatives 
such as mandatory expensing of stock options.46 Challenging 
conduct that these executives saw as a competitive necessity was 
bound to be a costly, and probably losing, battle. Hence, the implicit 
regulatory message was one of ambivalence, born of vain hope that 
the markets would take note and call the companies to task. SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt's prescient speech in 1998 about accounting 
42. See Max H. Bazennan et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN 
MGMT. REv. 89, 93 (1997); Mark W. Nelson & William R. Kinney, Jr., The Effect of Ambiguity 
on Loss Contingency Reporting Judgments, 72 ACCT. REv. 257,269-72 (1997); Mark W. Nelson 
et aI., Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings Management 
Decisions, 77 ACCT. REv. 175, 189-98 (Supp. 2002). The opposite problem also occurred. Under 
pressure from a variety of sources, some GAAP rules were changed to be more mechanical. 
That, too, made it impossible for the auditor to resist if the company was literally in 
compliance, even if the economic substance made no sense. For a useful discussion of these 
changes, see Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the 
Market, HARv. Bus. REv., July 2003, at 76, 78-80. 
43. See ECCLES ET AL., supra note 35, at 103-08. 
44. Note that the SEC's view that GAAP compliance is not a complete defense to a fraud 
claim resurrected a case, United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), that was largely 
forgotten until after the scandals. See note 64 infra. One would be hard pressed to find that 
kind of claim aggressively pursued or even threatened by the Commission during the 1990s. 
The same is true of many other legal positions taken in response to allegations of firms' 
fraudulent conduct. 
45. See Langevoort, supra note 26. 
46. For a recounting ofthe politics associated with these issues, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE 
TRAN'SFORMATION OF WALL STREET 714-41 (3ded. 2003). 
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gimmicks47 was far more of a wake-up call directed to investors than 
a signal that a wave of tough enforcement actions was immediately 
forthcoming.48 
. A$ a result, managers gradually learned from experience that 
~9d~tional steps in the direction oflower-quality financial reporting 
paid off without serious penalty. If neither the auditors nor the 
government was taking reporting seriously, why should they? The 
feedback loop then became a vicious cycle. The most aggressive 
executives pushed harder and harder. Enron was sufficiently proud 
of its regulatory arbitrage that it tried to market its creative 
accounting services to others. The very fact that it did this so 
brazenly shows that executives had little sense at this point that 
their conduct was seriously wrongful. In turn, less aggressive 
managers conformed. And inevitably some of this aggressiveness 
crossed over the line to starker forms of fraud. If no one is pushing 
back, why stop, especially when it is so easy to rationalize the 
cheating as utilitarian? As the cheating became more pronounced 
and business downturns occurred, the slippery slope became steeper 
as some managers realized that they had crossed the line and 
deliberately took more aggressive steps either to cover up the fraud 
or to gamble their way out of it. The important thing to remember, 
however, is how many situational forces combined to make the slope 
so wet. 
47. Securities and Exchange Commission Chainnan Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," 
Address at the New York University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), at 
http://www.sec.govlnewsispeecharchivesll9981spch220.txt.Toits credit, the SEC's action, 
once it began to take the issue seriously, was on the mark, though still not particularly heavy-
handed. A key step was the promulgation of Stsff Accounting Bulletin 99, which defined 
materiality for reporting purposes in terms of measures likely to influence investors 
regardless of quantitative significance. For an application of the materiality standard, see 
Ganino v. Citizens Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161-68 (2d Cir. 2000). 
48. Congress and the judiciary also contributed by making accounting-based "fraud on the 
market" lawsuits harder to bring. Although a good bit of this effort was in the form of 
protection to accounting firms and other "gatekeepers," see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding 
Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,'" 57 Bus. LAw. 1403, 1409-10 (2002), courts both 
before and after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act showed a strong willingness to 
dismiss cases on the ground that insufficient evidence of scienter was proffered even though 
the violation ofGAAP was clear. See, e.g., In re K-Tel Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2002); 
Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112 (lOth Cir. 1997); Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
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B. Evaluating the Harm 
That many of the financial reporting scandals were the product 
of strong situational forces is no excuse, especially to the extent that 
they caused severe harm. The harm, however, is more difficult to 
assess than most people think. Popular portrayals often cite 'the 
drop in stock price values from their highs as measures of what 
investors lost. That view, of course, is wrong-the inflated valua-
tions were illusions, and investors who were smart or lucky enough 
to have sold at or near the highs were simply gaining at some 
uninformed buyer's expense. The harm came to those who bought 
at inflated prices and held until it was too late. It is also easy to 
overestimate the net cost to investors, though surely it was 
significant. For every unfortunate buyer there was an innocent 
lucky seller, except. to the extent of sales by insiders or others with 
inside information. Although that fact is scant comfort to the 
particular buyers in question, it suggests that much of the effect of 
the fraud was in the form of pocket-shifting. The shareholder group 
most severely harmed was the set of undiversified investors-such 
as Enron employees with too much invested in that particular 
stock49-who bought and held. Less likely to be harmed were active, 
diversified traders. 
Indeed, in many ways scandals like Enron were as much frauds 
on debtholders as on holders of common stock. Designed in large 
part to make the company's credit rating appear more solid than it 
really was, and thus to facilitate access to a fluid supply of money, 
these schemes were intended to benefit equity holders, albeit with 
the infusion of a higher level of risk. Securities fraud also harms 
competitor firms-those who would have gotten more business or 
better market valuations if fairly compared to their peers, rather 
than looking inferior because other firms in the industry are cooking 
the books-which, in tum, leads to capital misallocation.50 There is 
a comparative dimension to this harm, however, because once 
aggressive reporting becomes the norm in an industry, the relative 
prejudice is lessened. As Judge Posner put it in a related context, in 
49. See Jennifer O'Hare, Mi8leading Employer Communications and the Securities Fraud 
Implications of the Employee as InlJestor, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1217, 1217-18 (2003). 
50. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should 
Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498,2540-50 (1997). 
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a setting where puffery is the order of the day, the unvarnished 
truth becomes misleading. 51 
Finally, there is the matter of comparative fault. It is hard to 
disentangle the portion of an inflated stock price that is tied to the 
tpisreporting from that simply caused by the market's exuberance. 
I suspect that many of the fraud cases occurred where the firm in 
question hit a streak of good fortune that generated an excess of 
investor enthusiasm and a stock price run-up without any serious 
misreporting. The situational pressures came from the desire to 
avoid negative surprises that would trigger an overreaction on the 
downside. In measuring the harm, the question is how much of the 
inflation would have occurred regardless of any fraud (i.e., was 
simply the product of investor exuberance) and how much was 
directly attributable to the misreporting. That question is not easily 
answered, either-certainly not simply by looking at the deflation 
that occurred once panic set in.52 
V. EFFECTIVE REGULATORY REFORM 
A. The Starting Point 
The likely efficacy of the regulatory reform stimulated by 
Sarbanes-Oxley can be measured against the foregoing. Technologi-
cal innovation is accelerating. There is no reason to believe that the 
pressures or the innovations described earlier will change. Thus, we 
can expect managers to be operating under those constraints for the 
foreseeable future. Market efficiency is more episodic. I am not 
willing to predict that the "retailization" of daily trading activity 
will be a permanent part of the capital markets; we could just as 
well see a return toward institutionalization if retail investors learn 
that active trading leads, on average, to inferior returns. History, 
however, teaches that investor sentiment, and carelessness, is 
cyclical and that there will be future periods of opportunity when 
the other pressures result in issuer-generated illusions that too 
easily become impounded in market price. 
51. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Where puffing is the 
order of the day, literal truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of 
letters of recommendation well know."). 
52. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 182-86. 
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Therefore, regulation has to be designed carefully in light of these 
realities and should not reflect a simplistic impression of what 
happened to give rise to the scandals. Take, for example, the 
increased independence requirements for audit committee members 
and board members generally.53 The prevailing impression that 
financial misreporting was about executive greed and the self-
serving desire to facilitate option exercises at the expense of the 
company's long-run interests easily justifies the effort to shift more 
power to outsiders. Implicitly-and explicitly, perhaps, in the SEC's 
recent efforts to allow large shareholders greater voice in nominat-
ing directors54-the idea is to have directors whose interests are 
more closely aligned with those of investors. If much of financial 
misreporting is competitive rather than selfish, however, we cannot 
expect such directors to interfere to any great extent. At best, they 
might moderate managerial over-optimism, but even this is not 
clear.55 Ironically, the scenario where independent directors are 
more likely to check this kind of behavior is where they are less 
interested in the returns to investors being generated by the 
company and thus more sensitive to their own liability risks. 
Directors who attend to nonshareholder constituencies-a group 
that plays an underestimated role in corporate govemance56 --could 
fall into this category of those more likely to seek legal compliance 
even in the face of strong competitive pressures. That is a very 
53. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2004); Standards 
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220, 79 SEC 
Docket 3736 (Apr. 16, 2003). 
54. See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PRoXY 
PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELEcTION OF DIRECTORS (July 15, 2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/newslstudies/proxyreport.pdf. 
55. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 809 
(2001). 
56. Governmental authorities, in particular, are an important nonshareholder 
constituency for directors who have close connections with them. See generally Anup Agrawal 
& Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Playa Political Role?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 179 
(2001) (pointing out that many directors are valuable to the boards on which they serve 
primarily for their political connections). This point connects to debates about shareholder 
primacy-undue attention to shareholder interests, especially when measured in short-term 
results, is not the same thing as the best interests of either the firm itself or society as a 
whole. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Directors'Duties in a Post·Enron World: Why Language 
Matters, 38 W AXE FOREST L. REv. 885, 891-95 (2003); Bratton, supra note 2, at 1326-28, 1359-
60. 
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different direction from most of the reform strategies we observe, 
which have bought heavily into the managerial selfishness story. 
B. :The Philosophy of Financial Reporting 
Much of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms are intended to restore both 
integrity and primacy to financial results as reported in accord with 
generally accepted accounting principles. The process by which 
GAAP is created is made more independent from the industry.57 A 
new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has been created 
to oversee and monitor auditor behavior.58 Conflicts of interest 
within auditing firm~ have been lessened. 59 The hope is that 
accounting rules will be less management-oriented and more 
inclined toward investor protection. In turn, issuers are barred from 
reporting financial results outside of GAAP without engaging in a 
cumbersome process of disclaimer and reconciliation. 60 
Whether this will work is unclear. If I am right about the 
pressures on the reporting process just described, technology-driven 
innovations are sure to overwhelm a system that is based on rules 
rather than principles.61 The more concrete the tests,62 the more 
effort will be devoted to finding sophisticated mechanisms to run 
ahead of them. It is doubtful that any regulatory body has the 
capacity-in terms of resources or expertise-to keep pace with this 
sort of innovation. Moreover, the accounting profession is still 
biased in the direction of rules that are complex and manipulable, 
because that increases the need for and value of their expertise and 
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 108-109, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7218-7219 (2004). 
58 .. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7217 (2004). 
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1, 7231 (2004). 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (2004); Conditions for Use ofNon-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 
Fed. Reg. 4820, 4820-30 (Jan. 30,2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 244.100-244.102); see 
also David Clarke et al., The SEC's New Disclosure Requirements for Non-GAAP Financial 
Information, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, at 2. 
61. In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley pushes the SEC and the FASB in the direction of principles 
rather than rules, presumably for this reason. See 15 U.S.C. § 7218(d) (2004); see also 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PROPOSAL FORA PRINCIPLES-BASED APPRoACH TO 
U.S. STANDARD SETTING, No. 1125-001 (Oct. 21, 2002), alJailable at http://www.fasb.org/ 
proposalslprinciples-based_approach. pdf. 
62. See BeI\iamin S. Neuhausen & Reva B. Steinberg, New Consolidation Rules for 
ViEs-Formerly Known as SPEs, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, at 19, 20 (discussing the 3% equity 
requirement for SPEs, which has been revised to 10%). 
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generates substantial returns in areas such as tax advisory services, 
which are expressly permitted under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
As a result, reliance on GAAP is necessary but not sufficient. 
Notably, senior executives will have to certify that the company.s 
financial report~ are not only compliant but "fairly present ... the 
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.~ We are 
told that this certification requirement will be a centerpiece of 
securities law enforcement, both civil and criminal. More generally, 
the SEC has also brought back to life an old accounting case, United 
States u. Simon, which held that GAAP compliance is not a defense 
to accounting fraud; reports can apparently be both compliant and 
false and misleading.64 The SEC has also reinterpreted the Manage-
ment Discussion and Analysis requirement to be the primary bridge 
between reported results and economic reality so that issuers risk 
being in violation if they conceal whatever is creating the 
difference.65 
Lurking herein is a problem to which lawyers have paid too little 
attention: what, precisely, is the right baseline for financial 
reporting? This is not just another way of asking the important 
question of whether the accounting rules should be tilted toward 
principles rather than rules,66 wherein we have to decide how much 
subjective discretion should be afforded those responsible for 
preparing or auditing the financial statements. In light oftechnolog-
ical innovation, I think principles are plainly preferable to rules, 
even if this increases the resources that must be devoted to ex post 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1241(aX3) (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). 
64. 425 F.2d 796, 805-06, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1969). For a critique of broad readings of Sinwn, 
see Christian J. Mixter, United States v. Simon and the New Certification Provisions, 76 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REv. 699, 703-05, 708·13 (2002). Read carefully, it is not clear that Simon is 
necessarily about the issue cited-though dicta in the case certainly can be so read. My 
explanation of the case-which involved nondisclosure of certain insider transactions-is that 
the accountants aided and abetted the insiders' fraud by certifying the financials as GAAP 
compliant when apparently they were aware of the self-dealing scheme. 
65. Commission Statement About Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8056, 76 SEC Docket 2220 
(Jan. 25, 2002). 
66. See SEC. & EXCH. CoMM'N, STuDy PuRsuANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-
OxLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPI'ION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REpoRTING SYsTEM 
OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYsTEM (July 26, 2003), at http://www.sec.govlnews! 
studies/principlesbasedstand.htm. 
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enforcement.67 Even in a principles-based world, however, the 
question is: what principles? 
Take, for example, one of the fundamental principles on which 
accounting has long been based: conservatism.68 Caution should rule 
in the face of uncertainty-hence, the bias is usually to overstate 
costs (or losses) and understate income (or gains). Many more 
specific accounting rules are bright-line efforts to impose this same 
bias on financial results. Should conservatism be a guiding principle 
in a post-Enron world? 
While many people instinctively say "of course" -especially with 
the recent scandals in mind-remember that conservatism nearly 
assures reporting inaccuracy. Imagine, for example, the CEO asked 
to certify that financials that have been prepared conservatively 
"fairly present" the financial condition and results of operations of 
the firm. If, by fairly present, we mean "reflect economic reality," 
then they almost surely do not-because they are probably too 
conservative. Indeed, if the story we told earlier is right, there are 
likely numerous places where either conservatism or some cognate 
accounting rule or principle results in an artificial representation of 
the firm's condition that is significantly distinct from economic 
reality.69 And that is with faithful, indeed slavish, adherence to 
GAAP. 
This is hardly a novel insight. For years now the accounting 
profession has been debating the role of "fair value" accounting in 
which the objective of all prevailing rules and principles is to 
67. As Professor Bratton has pointed out, a principles-based regime depends on a strong 
enforcer, given management's temptations to construe ambiguous, subjective principles in its 
favor. If the accounting profession is not sufficiently reformed, then only aggressive 
enforcement will do. See William W. Bratton, Enroll., Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
versus Principles versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003) (arguing that tough enforcement 
is necessary if Sarbanes-Oxley is to have its intended effect). On the tendency of accountants 
to see ambiguous rules in self-serving terms, see Max H. Bazerman et aI., Why Good 
Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov. 2002, at 97,98-99. 
68. See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of 
Earnings, 24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 7-10 (1997); Ross L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting-
Part I: Explanations and Implications, 1-3 (The Bedley Pol'y Research Ctr.,Working Paper No. 
FR 03-16, 2003), at http://papers.ssrn.comlsoI3lpapers.cfm?abstracUd=414522. 
69. For a good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of GAAP as a generator 
of "quality" earnings, see Stephen H. Penman, The Quality of Financial Statements: 
Perspectives from the Recent Stock Market Bubble, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 77 (Supp. 2003). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 25 2004-2005
2004] TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 25 
present the performance of the firm in a fair and unbiased fashion. 70 
Best estimates of current valuations ("mark to market")71 substitute 
for historic cost and other artificial measures. The argument for fair 
value, of course, is that the conservatism bias in accounting 
effectively limits managers' ability to portray accurately the firm's 
financial condition, which is not necessarily in the shareholders' 
best interests. After all, the securities laws are built on investors' 
need for accurate information. Any reporting rule, such as account-
ing standards that deal with expensing versus capitalization, that 
fails to capture economic reality with a high enough level of 
sensitivity risks communicating misleading information to inves-
tors, distorting rather than aiding inter-firm comparisons. This risk 
is one reason why accounting scholars often point out that earnings 
management creates potential benefits for investors as well as 
imposing obvious costS.72 
We saw that frustration with the artificial norms of reporting 
may have motivated the inclination to test limits and become 
cynical about the relevance of GAAP reporting, especially in the 
high-tech sector. 73 Some of those who began to manage earnings and 
other financial results were fair value revolutionaries, engaging in 
acts of GAAP disobedience after convincing themselves that their 
reports were a fairer representation of the information to which 
investors should be paying attention. A number of investigations-
including World Com 74 and recently, Freddie Mac75-have noted that 
management responsible for the violations justified their violations 
on precisely these grounds. 
70. See Stanley Siegel. The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair 
Value as the Fundamental Principle ofGAAP. 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1839. 1848 (1996). 
71. [d. 
72. The reasons why can be quite complex. and the literature is extensive. See, e.g., Anil 
Arya et al., Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle, 3 REV. ACCT. STUD. 7 (1998); 
Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Vrews of 
Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235, 242-47 (2000). 
73. A survey of executives has demonstrated that while most believe their companies to 
be undervalued in the market, the perception is strongest among high-tech managers. See 
ECCLES ET AL., supra note 35, at 48. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
75. See Patrick Barta et al., Behind Freddie Mac's Troubles: A Strategy to Take on More 
Risk, WAU.ST.J., Sept. 22, 2003, atAl, A12 ("Some Freddie Mac officials who were involved 
in the matter privately say they believed the maneuvers actually gave a truer picture of the 
business .... The Baker Botts report confirmed this motivation. "). 
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The conservatism bias, however, has compelling virtues that 
imake it hard to reject. It counters managers' natural bias toward 
optimism-thus offering a more credible anchor from which future 
earnings can be estimated76-and constrains managerial opportun-
. ism.77 When there is no reliable market, mark-to-market accounting 
invites highly skewed estimates, as happened in Enron. Knowing 
that assets are real and that movements of funds and property are 
properly recorded, even if in accord with artificial rules, is a good 
way of keeping managers honest in their stewardship of the 
company. Moreover, financial statements play multiple roles. From 
the standpoint of a creditor of the firm, conservatism and artificial 
rules make ample sense: because there is only downside risk and no 
upside participation, conservatism operates as a useful buffer in 
conveying warnings about potential solvency problems. That 
accounting principles were born at a time when bank lending and 
other forms of debt financing dominated corporate financial activity 
plausibly explains the strength of the bias. 
The equity holder with a relatively short-term investment 
horizon-interested in the upside as well as the downside-is in a 
more ambiguous position, however, because there is a clear trade-off 
between accuracy and verifiability.78 My suspicion is that we have 
another piece of the story here. The 1980s and 1990s brought the 
flourishing of an equity culture and the significant acceleraton of 
portfolio turnover by both institutional and retail investors. 
Managers, too, took on this perspective as their compensation 
packages became more heavily equity-based and liquidity-oriented. 
With an equity bias, accounting discipline was viewed as especially 
rigid and confining. In turn, this rigidity exacerbated broader 
concerns. Another strong complaint against GAAP is that it 
penalizes "knowledge"-based firms by excluding measures of 
intellectual and human capital, wherein real comparative advan-
tages lie. Conventionally computed earnings are also misleading for 
76. See, e.g., Penman, supra note 69, at 81-93. 
77. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 439,453 & n.53 (2003); Watts, supra note 68, at 3-4. 
78. Investors with a very short-term horizon who trade on volatility may well prefer 
aggressive accounting to the extent that they believe they can game the system. See Bratton, 
supra note 77, at 462. 
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that reason.79 We miss something if we forget that the era of 
accounting scandals occurred at a time when so many people 
thought that GAAP was in many ways archaic. They were-and still 
are-probably right. 
My point here is not to take a position on the relative merits of 
conservatism and the various approaches to fair-value accounting. 
Instead, I am simply offering context. Much ofSarbanes-Oxley-not 
to mention media attention to the scandals-operates as ifGAAP is 
a form of religious orthodoxy from which departures can properly be 
labeled heresy, making earnings management patently sinful. The 
truth is far murkier, however. As a leading accounting scholar, 
Baruch Lev, has observed, "[tJhe extent to which GAAP fulfills its 
mission-the dissemination of quality financial information, and 
earnings in particular, to facilitate investors' valuations and the 
monitoring of management-has frequently been challenged, but 
never more hotly than in the last couple of years."so 
So long as the underlying philosophy of financial reporting is 
doubted, a strong norm of compliance is unlikely to emerge. 
Moreover, in light of these doubts, even material, intentional 
accounting violations are likely to run along a lengthy continuum of 
wrongfulness.81 From the standpoint of investors, at least, a 
violation that takes the report farther away from the underlying 
economics is far more serious than one that takes it closer-and 
both kinds of cases are likely to arise with some frequency. 
Most importantly, what this means is that over-deterrence can 
have significant costs. Imagine, for example, that the upshot of the 
certification requirement for senior executives is to make them 
virtual guarantors of GAAP compliance, at the risk of criminal 
prosecution for defection. Assume further that this requirement 
works as intended and that executives obsess on compliance. In a 
regime where conservatism is the dominant philosophy, there is 
likely to be an excess of caution, so that reports move further away 
79. See, e.g., Thomas A. Stewart, Accounting Gets Radical, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2001, at 
184-86; see also supra note 35. 
80. Lev, supra note 12, at 32. 
81. For a provocative claim about why some degree of earnings management is a distinct 
social good, see Anil Arya et al., Are UnmaTUJged Earnings Always Better for Sharelwlders?, 
17 ACCT. HORIZONS 111 (Supp. 2003). 
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:from economic reality. Because it is too dangerous to push against 
the norms, the value of the underlying information is reduced. 
I am not necessarily predicting this result because the technology-
driven pressures toward "competitive" financial reporting are so 
strong.82 What I am suggesting instead is that many executives are 
likely to be caught in the middle of these forces, making the cases 
that arise as a result very hard. Many of the recent reforms move 
the rock and the hard place closer together. The rule that makes 
non-GAAP disclosures far more difficult is an example,83 because it 
chills the issuer's use of one of the methods of communicating a 
different story about economic reality. Regulation FD (Fair 
Disclosure)-the ban on private communications of material 
nonpublic information84-however well-justified on other grounds, 
closes another avenue to telling the non-GAAP story. 
No system of enforcement will achieve the right balance if it 
ignores the ambiguity and debate surrounding the threshold 
question of what constitutes a "good" financial report in the first 
place. Passing judgment on often ambiguous conduct and its net of 
social benefits and harms is an extraordinarily difficult task-not 
the easy, Sentencing Guidelines-like formula that we have been led 
to think it is. Hence, we should turn to the process of enforcement 
and adjudication to see if it is up to the task of disentangling the 
good guys from the bad in settings where the distinctions involve so 
many different shades of gray. 
VI. A FRESH LoOK AT THE ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES 
If the foregoing is right, then post-Sarbanes-Oxley securities 
regulation has to accept the permanence of innovation and respond 
82. Nor would such a regime be politically stable. Cf John C. Coates IV, Private vs. 
Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost I Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 
531, 561-64 (2001) (advocating the use of a model that takes into account the ability of 
executives to ·capture" government enforcement mechanisms in the disclosure area). Strong 
deterrence is expensive and difficult, making it likely that prosecutions would be fairly 
random and episodic. The fear of unfairly being singled out for criminal-like punishment 
would likely trigger a political backlash from managers-perhaps justifiablY""""7that would 
quietly seek to disable the enforcement system. 
83. See supra note 60. 
84. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 73 
SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 24, 2000). 
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accordingly. So long as there remains a disconnection between 
GAAP and economic reality, there will be intense pressures on the 
system and a large amount of managerial conduct that will test the 
limits of the rules. Accepting arguendo that this gap cannot be 
eliminated without introducing so much subjectivity that the system 
loses its grounding (and becomes far less useful for creditor 
protection or for supervising management's stewardship over 
assets), the best solution is care and moderation in its application. 
Securities regulation, then, has to be flexibly responsive to 
technological change. This approach requires an enforcement 
system capable of responding quickly to police line-challenging 
conduct and an adjudicatory system capable of evaluating the 
nature of any misconduct and of applying a remedy. On the 
assumption that proportionality is in the long-term interest of 
investors, the question becomes what kind of adjudicatory system 
best delivers proportionate results. Again, the task of the adjudica-
tor is to untangle the complicated reporting mess and determine 
what the motivations were, how bad the misconduct was in context, 
and what the right remedy is in light of the factual findings. That 
task is extremely hard, and it is doubtful that the federal courts 
have the patience and business expertise to make these judgments 
with consistent accuracy. Indeed, business expertise is lacking in 
the judicial system, with the exception of the Delaware judiciary, 
which uniquely has both the incentives and opportunity to learn 
from experience and become skilled at these tasks. 
This reality suggests to me that the federal securities 
adjudicatory process should be made, as much as possible, an 
administrative rather than judicial process. Use of administrative 
law courts is the norm in banking and other financial services 
regulation and in the SEC's supervision of securities professionals.85 
Administrative proceedings in those areas can be used to fine, 
censure, and bar subjects from continued involvement in the 
industry-a powerful set of penalties. 
Securities regulation has not, however, internalized the 
adjudicatory process with respect to public company wrongdoing. 
That task was left to the judicial process. To be sure, there have 
85. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 863-65 (3d 
ed.2001). 
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long been administrative remedies that force issuers to correct their 
filings, and in 1990, Congress added cease-and-desist authority to 
the Commission's in-house toolkit.86 But this expansion of authority 
did not have any significant punitive capacity. In Sarbanes-Oxley, 
however, there was a little-noticed change that has begun a revision 
here-allowing the SEC to use cease-and-desist proceedings to bar 
officers and directors involved in securities misconduct from further 
service in that capacity with any public company.87 The Commission 
can now bring a financial misreporting case internally that is 
designed not simply to expose the conduct but also to punish the 
executives involved. More recently, the SEC has asked Congress to 
add to this authority the ability to impose fines on the executives 
and the companies.88 Were the remedial package complete,89 the 
administrative proceeding could be the mechanism of choice for the 
adjudication of financial misreporting cases, creating the possibility 
that the administrative law judges could over time gain the 
expertise in this area comparable to the Delaware chancery. 
If administrative law judges were indeed given the opportunity to 
develop such an expertise, the change in corporate and securities 
law might be profound. Internalizing corporate misreporting and 
fraud cases would permit administrative law judges and the SEC 
not only to find the facts but also to develop law, subject to (presum-
ably deferential) appellate oversight by the courts. In other words, 
there would be a shift that would permit the Commission to have a 
greater voice in evaluating conduct going to the core of financial 
disclosure and in a wide range of matters touching on corporate 
governance. There is no meaningful line between the spheres of 
governance and transparency; they overlap greatly.90 Recall that one 
of the great innovations in corporate law-the prohibition against 
insider trading-was set in motion by the SEC by using its lawmak-
86. rd. at 865-73. 
87. Sarbanes-Oxley Actof2002 § 1105, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7Th-1, 78u-3 (2004). On the use of bar 
orders prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, see Jayne W. Barnard, When is a Corporate E:xecutilJe 
·Substantially Unfit to Serve-?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489 (1992). 
88. See Hill Watch, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1122 (July 7, 2003). 
89. A truly complete system would include equitable relief beyond the accounting and 
disgorgement specifically authorized under Section 21C(e), though it would probably be 
acceptable to require judicial assistance in granting this sort of remedy. 
90. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit 
of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001). 
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ing ability in bringing its first case against a stockbroker.91 By 
finding open-market insider trading to be a fraud-notwithstanding 
a nearly universal assumption to the contrary at that time-the 
Commission federalized a form of perceived managerial opportun-
ism. Broadening the scope of the Commission's authority to do the 
same to the full range of undisclosed executive misconduct would 
expand the Commission's lawmaking ability considerably. 
That proposal no doubt frightens many and seems to be an 
assault on federalism. Indeed, efforts have been made in the bills 
dealing with penalty authority to create a direct right of appeal to 
a federal district court from the administrative law judge's imposi-
tion of a penalty, which would substantially reduce the full Commis-
sion's ability to make law. My sense is that the net of risks and 
benefits from administrative adjudication makes internalization 
attractive over a variety of dimensions. It is the one system likely to 
deliver the consistent, expert, and proportionate response to 
financial misconduct and, thus, the most stable balance in investor 
protection. Enlarging the SEC's adjudicatory power makes it less 
likely that future scandals will lead to the kind of heavy-handed 
reaction implicit in portions ofSarbanes-Oxley. 
CONCLUSION 
Technological innovation poses a problem for all forms of 
regulation, not just securities. Regulatory lag is inevitable when the 
pace of change is fast and the subject complicated.92 When that kind 
of lag is coupled with a loss of restraint by the class of persons to 
be protected, as occurred in securities regulation in the 1990s, 
opportunism is almost certain. 
In 2003, by virtue of hindsight, that opportunism looks particu-
larly venal and corrupt. A serious attempt to remember what it was 
like five years or so ago, however, changes the picture. A survival-of-
the-fittest contest was going on in a variety of product markets, with 
the sense that the winners would take much, if not nearly all. 
91. In re Cady,Roberts &Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907-08 (1961); see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1319, 1320-21 (1999). 
92. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the 
Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 405-12 (1990). 
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Aggressiveness was celebrated, and investors were enthusiastic to 
place their bets on who would prevail. It turns out that many firms 
inflated their prospects in search of capital and customers out of 
some mixture of greed and fear. For some, the bubble burst 
completely. 
The purpose of securities regulation is to restrain the worst kind 
of insider opportunism and make transparent as much about issuers 
as is practicable.93 We have to look hard at each of the so-called 
scandals to find out the extent to which the misreporting was driven 
by executive selfishness to misappropriate value from investors. To 
this extent, harsh remedial intervention is needed. But if we find 
more of an excess of competitive zeal in a time of extraordinary 
normative uncertainty-aided by the market's own exuberance and 
the law's ambivalent signals-the response should be more mea-
sured. Lumping all the rule-breaking into a single tale of corporate 
evil makes for bad justice and bad policy. 
93. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1055-60 (1995). 
